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Аbstract. The present paper presents a logic that allows for the abnormal
behaviour of any logical constant and for the ambiguous behaviour of any
non-logical constant, but nevertheless offers an interpretation of the premises
that is as normal as possible.
1. Aim of This Paper
Although adaptive logics are strictly formal logics, they integrate
several typical aspects of 'argumentation': dynamic reasoning, meaning
variance (of logical as well as non-logical constants), inferential
information (as opposed to omniscience), and languages that are not
compounded by pre-fixed building blocks (see especially [7] and [6]).
The dynamics of the proofs relates to the fact that adaptive logics do
not, as usual non-standard logics, invalidate certain rules of inference,
but restrict their applications to consequences of the premises that fulfil
certain conditions.
The first adaptive logics handled inconsistent sets of premises by
interpreting them as consistently as possible (see, e.g., [4] and [1]).
Later adaptive logics handled other forms of logical abnormality. Still
later, logical abnormality deriving from the abnormal behaviour of non-
logical constants (ambiguities) was integrated. Recently, the Ghent
Group discovered adaptive logics that have nothing to do with logical
abnormalities (compatibility, the consistent extensions of theories,
abduction, …).
Considering abnormality-adaptive logics, one wonders whether it is
possible to devise a logic that adapts to all forms of abnormalities. Such
a system would open radically new perspectives on logic. It would
allow for abnormalities of all kinds, but still presuppose (classical)
normality 'unless and until proven otherwise'. In other words, it would
be capable of recapturing all of Classical Logic – henceforth CL –
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2while still allowing for all sorts of deviations from it. In this paper I
present such a logic, ACL∅2.
One way of describing the situation is by saying that, in ACL∅2,
all derivation is conditional. That A is derivable from Γ does not only
depend on the intended meaning of the logical constants and on the
intended meaning stability of the non-logical constants; it is also
depends on whether the specific content of Γ does not rule out that
intended meaning and that intended stability.
2. Abnormality-Adaptive Logics
The first formulation of adaptive logics (see [4] and [1]) was proof-
theoretical. Later a decent adequate semantics was developed (see [2],
[8], and elsewhere). Meanwhile, many inconsistency-adaptive logics
have been studied (see [19], [21], [22], [15], [17], and [12]), their use to
several domains of application has been shown (see [3], [7], [16], and
[18]), and several other logics (some non-monotonic logics, see [5] and
[15], and all consequence relations defined from the Rescher-Manor
mechanism, see [12]) have been integrated. I refer to [11] for a survey.
Even if the dynamics aspects of the proofs are among the most
fascinating aspects of adaptive logics, space limitations prevent me to
describe them here. So, let me at least mention one central feature.
At the predicative level, adaptive logics are not only undecidable3;
for most of them, there is no positive test for derivability. Nevertheless,
there are certain criteria that tell us, in specific cases, that a wff derived
in a proof from Γ at a stage, is finally derived from Γ4.
Where such criteria cannot be applied, it still can be demonstrated
that derivability at a stage offers us the best estimate of the final
consequences of the premises – best in view of the present under-
standing of the premises as revealed in the proof5.
An abnormality-adaptive logic is defined from a lower limit logic (a
monotonic paraconsistent logic) and an upper limit logic (usually CL)
by an adaptive strategy. The latter determines the way in which the
logic reacts to an inconsistency (or a disjunction of inconsistencies). All
abnormality-adaptive logics interpret a theory `as normaly as possible' -
this phrase is ambiguous and is specified by the strategy.
The semantic characterization proceeds in terms of the models from
the lower limit logic (that include the models from the upper limit
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3logic). From those models of Γ a subset is selected in view of the
strategy. The formulas true in all selected models are the adaptive
consequences of Γ (those finally derivable from it).
As an example, consider the semantics for ACLuN2. Let L be the
language of CL, with S, C, V, Pr, F and W the sets of sentential letters,
individual constants, individual variables, predicative letters of rank r,
and formulas and wffs respectively. In order to handle the quantifiers in
a simple way, we extend L to L+ by introducing a set of pseudo-
constants O that has at least the cardinality of the largest models we
want to consider. Let W+ be the set of pseudo-wffs of L+ and let ~W+ =
{~A | A ∈ W+}.
A model M = <D, v>, in which v is an interpretation of W+, and
hence of W, which is what we are interested in. The assignment
function is defined by:
C1.1 v : S → {0, 1}
C1.2 v : C∪O → D (where D = {v(α) | α ∈ C∪O})
C1.3 v : Pr → ℘( Dr) (the power set of the r-th Cartesian product
of D)
C1.4 v : ~W+ → {0, 1}
The valuation function vM determined by M is defined as follows:
C2.1 vM : W+ → {0, 1}
C2.2 where A ∈ S, vM(A) = v(A); vM(⊥) = 0
C2.3 vM(πr α1 … αr) = 1 iff <v(α1), …, v(αr)> ∈ v(πr)
C2.4 vM(α = β) = 1 iff v(α) = v(β)
C2.5 vM(~A) = 1 iff vM(A) = 0 or v(~A) = 1
C2.6 vM (A ⊃ B) = 1 iff vM(A) = 0 or vM(B) = 1
C2.7 vM (A  ∧ B) = 1 iff vM(A) = 1 and vM(B) = 1
C2.8 vM (A ∨ B) = 1 iff vM(A) = 1 or vM(B) = 1
C2.9 vM (A ≡ B) = 1 iff vM(A) = vM(B)
C2.10 vM((∀α) A(α)) = 1 iff vM(A(β)) = 1 for all β ∈ C∪O
C2.11 vM((∃α)A(α))=1 iff vM(A(β))=1 for at least one β ∈ C∪O
Truth in a model, semantic consequence, and validity are defined
as usual.
The inconsistency-adaptive logic ACLuN2 is obtained from
CLuN by the Minimal Abnormality Strategy. The abnormal part of a
CLuN-model is defined as Ab(M) =df {A ∈ F | vM(∃(A ∧ ~A) = 1},
where ∃ denotes a sequence of existential quantifiers over all variables
free in A.
4Definition 1 A CLuN-model M of Γ is a minimally abnormal model of
Γ iff no CluN-model M' of Γ is such that Ab(M') ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 2 Γ |=ACLuN2 A iff A is true in all minimally abnormal models
of Γ.
Apart from the Soundness and Strong Completeness of final
derivability (see [8] for the definition) with respect to the semantics,
many nice metaproperties have been proved. Proofs may be found in
[8], [10], and some forthcoming papers. Some criteria for final
derivability were obtained in view of tableau methods (see [13]), others
in view of results of the block approach (see [6]).
The (negation-)incompleteness-adaptive logic that is the dual of
ACLuN2 is called ACLaN2 and is obtained as follows. First we
characterize CLaN, a logic allowing for gaps rather than gluts with
respect to negation, by replacing in the semantics for CLuN:
C2.5 vM(~A) = 1 iff vM(A) = 0 and vM(~A) = 1
ACLaN2 is obtained from CLaN by the Minimal Abnormality
Strategy, where Ab(M) =df {A ∈ F | vM(∃(A ∨ ~A) = 0}.
There are other logical abnormalities. Let us consider gaps with
respect to conjunction, as they occur in the logic called (by the same
naming convention) CLaC. Define ^W+ = {A ∧ B | A, B ∈ W+}, and
accommodate the CLuN-semantics as follows. Clause C1.4 of the
CLuN-semantics is replaced by
C1.4 v : ^W+ → {0, 1}
whereas C2.5 and C2.7 now become:
C2.5 vM(~A) = 1 iff vM(A) = 0
C2.7 vM(A ∧ B) = 1 iff vM(A) = vM(B) = 1 and v(A ∧ B) = 1
The adaptive logic ACLaC2 is obtained from the lower limit logic
CLaC by the Minimal Abnormality Strategy. We use classical
conjunction (defined, e.g., as A Π B =df ~(~A ∨ ~B)) to define the
abnormal part of a model M: Ab(M) =df {A∧B ∈ F | vM(∃(A Π B Π
~(A∧B))) = 1}, and adjust Definitions 1 and 2.
We may proceed similarly to allow for gluts or gaps with respect to
other logical constants, and to devise a corresponding adaptive logic.
A somewhat different approach is to allow for ambiguities in the
non-logical constants6. Here, the difference between the lower limit
logic and the upper limit logic is obtained by a difference in
interpretation of the premises. The upper limit logic interprets them in
the usual way, but the lower limit logic interprets them by considering
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5each occurrence of a non-logical constant as having a different
meaning. This is indicated by a different index (a superscripted
number) that is attached to each such occurrence in both the premises
and the purported conclusion. In preparation of Section 3, I briefly spell
this out.
The language L is upgraded in the obvious way to accommodate the
indexed non-logical constants. Let the result be LI. Let CI be the set of
indexed individual constants. Let Γ† and A‡ be the results of attaching a
different index to each occurrence of a non-logical constant in Γ∪{A}.
For example ((p ∧ ~q) ⊃ ~p)† and ~p‡ might be ((p1 ∧ ~q1) ⊃ ~p2) and
~p3 respectively. The lower limit logic, CLA, is defined by7
Γ |=CLA A  iff  Γ† |=CL A‡
Obviously (p∧q) |≠CLA p, as nothing warrants that vM(p1) = vM(p2).
However, ~(p1≡p2) counts as an abnormality with respect to the normal
interpretation of the premises. For C the abnormalities are of the form
~αi=αj, for Pr they are of the form ~((∀α1)…(∀αr)(πi α1 … αr ≡ πj α1
… αr)). Define Ab(M) accordingly. By selecting the minimally
abnormal models of Γ, the adaptive logic ACLA2 interprets the
premises as normally (that is, unambiguously) as possible.
It is tempting to devise logics that are adaptive with respect to
several kinds of abnormalities, for example with respect to
inconsistency and incompleteness, or with respect to ambiguities and
gluts with respect to the universal quantifier. Two brief remarks will
clarify how this is done.
A logic that allows for both gluts and gaps with respect to, for
example, negation – we call this logic CLoN – is obtained by replacing,
in the CLuN semantics, clause C2.5 as follows:
C2.5 vM(~A) = v(~A)
With this clarified, the combination of any logical abnormalities is
fairly obvious (and so is the definition of Ab(M)). 
If we combine many abnormalities, the remaining classical
connectives might not be functionally complete, which will hinder the
definition of Ab(M). As I need to consider such a case in the subsequent
section, I briefly discuss the matter. Let us again consider {A ∈ F |
vM(∃(A ∧ ~A) = 1} and eliminate the "∃'' and "∧'' from it. Suppose that
x1,… , xn are the variables that occur free in A. Let [A]o1,x1,…, …,onxn be the
result of systematically replacing each xi by some oi ∈ C∪O. To avoid
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6clutter, I henceforth write x for x1, …, xn and o for o1, …, on. Remark
that vM(∃(A ∧ ~A) = 1 iff there are o such that vM([A]ox) = vM([~A]ox) =
18. Proceeding thus, we may eliminate all 'auxiliary' logical constants
from the definition of Ab(M).
3. The Empty Logic and Its Adaptive Extension
Here I combine all kinds of abnormalities. The lower limit logic
will be called CL∅. We start with CLoX, the logic that allows both
gluts and gaps with respect to all logical constants. Where M=<D, v> is
a CLoX-model, v is defined by:
C1.1 v : S → {0, 1}
C1.2 v : C∪O → D (where D = {v(α) | α ∈ C∪O})
C1.3 v : Pr → ℘( Dr) (the power set of the r-th Cartesian product
of D)
C1.4 v : =W+ → {0, 1}
C1.5 v : ~W+ → {0, 1}
C1.6 v : ⊃W+ → {0, 1}
C1.7 v : ∧W+ → {0, 1}
C1.8 v : ∨W+ → {0, 1}
C1.9 v : ≡W+ → {0, 1}
C1.10 v : ∀W+ → {0, 1}
C1.11 v : ∃W+ → {0, 1}
The valuation function vM determined by M is defined as follows:
C2.1 vM : W+ → {0, 1}
C2.2 where A ∈ S, vM(A) = v(A); vM(⊥) = 0
C2.3 vM(πr α1 … αr) = 1 iff <v(α1), …, v(αr)> ∈ v(πr)
C2.4 vM(α = β) = 1 iff v(α = β)
C2.5 vM(~A) = v(~A)
C2.6 vM(A ⊃ B) = v(A ⊃ B)
C2.7 vM(A  ∧ B) = v(A  ∧ B)
C2.8 vM(A ∨ B) = v(A ∨ B)
C2.9 vM(A  ≡ B) = v(A  ≡ B)
C2.10 vM((∀α) A(α)) = v((∀α) A(α))
C2.11 vM((∃α)A(α)) = v((∃α)A(α))
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7Truth in a model, semantic consequence, and validity are defined as
usual.
We now upgrade CLoX to CL∅. Let Γ† and A‡ be as in Section 2.
Definition 3 Γ |=CL∅ A  iff  Γ† |=CLoX A‡
Γ |=CL∅ A iff ⊥∈Γ. So, if we remove ⊥ from L, Γ |≠CL∅ A for all Γ
and A.
To formulate ACL∅2, obtained from CL∅ by the Minimal
Abnormality strategy, I define Ab(M) as the union of the sets listed
below (defined in terms of CLoX-models). I suppose throughout that A,
B ∈ F and that each defining clause is preceded by: for some o ∈
CI∪O.
{A | vM([A]ox) = vM([~A]ox)},
{<A ⊃ B, A, B> | vM([A ⊃ B]ox) = vM([A]ox) = 1 and vM([B]ox) = 0},
{<A ⊃ B, A> | vM([A ⊃ B]ox) = 0 and vM([A]ox) = 0},
{<A ⊃ B, B> | vM([A ⊃ B]ox) = 0 and vM([B]ox) = 1},
{<A ∧ B, A, B> | vM([A ∧ B]ox) = 0 and vM([A]ox) = vM([B]ox) = 1},
{<A ∧ B, A> | vM([A ∧ B]ox) = 1 and vM([A]ox) = 0},
{<A ∧ B, B> | vM([A ∧ B]ox) = 1 and vM([B]ox) = 0},
{<A ∨ B, A, B> | vM([A ∨ B]ox) = 1 and vM([A]ox) = vM([B]ox) = 0},
{<A ∨ B, A> | vM([A ∨ B]ox) = 0 and vM([A]ox) = 1},
{<A ∨ B, B> | vM([A ∨ B]ox) = 0 and vM([B]ox) = 1},
{<A ≡ B, A, B> | vM([A ≡ B]ox) ≠ (vM([A]ox) = vM([B]ox))}9,
{<(∀α) A(α), A(β)> | β ∈ CI; vM([(∀α) A(α)]ox) = 1 and vM([A(β)]ox) =
0},
{<(∀α) A(α), A(β)> | β ∈ O; vM([(∀α) A(α)]ox) =  1 and vM([A(γ)]ox) =
0 for some γ ∈ CI∪O},
{<(∀α) A(α), A(β)> | β ∈ V; vM([(∀α) A(α)]ox) = 0 and vM([A(γ)]ox) = 1
for all γ ∈ CI∪O},
{<(∃α) A(α), A(β)> | β ∈ V; vM([(∃α) A(α)]ox) = 1 and vM([A(γ)]ox) = 0
for all γ ∈ CI∪O},
{<(∃α) A(α), A(β)> | β ∈ CI; vM([(∃α) A(α)]ox) = 0 and vM([A(β)]ox) =
1},
{<(∃α) A(α), A(β)> | β ∈ V; vM([(∃α) A(α)]ox) = 0 and vM([A(γ)]ox) = 1
for some γ ∈ CI∪O},
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8{<α, β> | α, β ∈ CI; vM(α = β) ≠ (v(α) = v(β))},
{<α, β> | α ∈ CI; β ∈ V; for some γ ∈ CI∪O, vM(α = γ) ≠ (v(α) =
v(γ))},
{<α, β> | α ∈ V; β ∈ CI; for some γ ∈ CI∪O, vM(γ = β) ≠ (v(γ) = v(β))},
{<α, β> | α, β ∈ V; for some γ, δ ∈ CI∪O, vM(γ = δ) ≠ (v(γ) = v(δ))},
{<A, i, j> | A ∈ S and vM(Ai) ≠ vM(Aj)},
{<α, i, j> | α ∈ C and v(αi) ≠ v(αj)}, and
{<π, i, j> | π ∈ Pr and v(πi) ≠ v(πj)},
Definition 4 A CLoX-model M of Γ† is a minimally abnormal model of
Γ† iff no CLoX-model M' of Γ† is such that Ab(M') ⊃ Ab(M).
Definition 5 Γ |=ACL∅2 A  iff  A‡ is true in all minimally abnormal
models of Γ†.
It is easily provable (compare [8]) that, if Γ has CL-models, then
the minimally abnormal models of Γ† are those in which all logical
constants as well as all occurrences of non-logical constants behave
normally. Hence:
Γ |=ACL∅2 A  iff  Γ |=CL A.
If Γ has no CL-models, then (except for border cases) the
minimally abnormal models of Γ† are a proper subset of the CLoX-
models of Γ†. In this case, ACL∅2 still delivers a minimally abnormal
interpretation of Γ: all CL-consequences of Γ, except for those that do
not follow from Γ in view of the disjunctions of abnormalities that are
verified by all CLox-models of Γ†.
I leave it to the reader to check the following properties of ACL∅2:
p, ~p |≠ACL∅2 q
p∧q, ~p |≠ACL∅2 q
p ∧ ~r, ~p ∧ (q ⊃ r) |≠ACL∅2 ~q
∀x(Px ⊃ Qx), Pa, ~Qa, Pb, ~Qc |≠ACL∅2 Qb ∧ ~Pc
Remark that p, ~p |≠ACL∅2 p and p, ~p |≠ACL∅2 ~p. Some of the
minimally abnormal interpretations of the premises requires the non-
logical constant (represented here by the propositional letter) p to
behave ambiguously: the truth-value of p1 is different from that of p2.
So, the truth-value p3 is bound to agree with that of either p1 or p2. As
the same reasoning applies to the other non-logical constants, one easily
proves the remarkable:
Theorem 1 For all Γ, Cn ACL∅2(Γ) is consistent.
94. In Conclusion
As promised, ACL∅2 is a universally abnormality-adaptive logic.
Allowing all kinds of abnormalities in the premises, it still interpretats
them “as normal as possible”. The latter expression has (as always) a
specific meaning. But this meaning is an interesting one: whatever is
consistently derivable from the premises. As one cannot determine
beforehand which abnormalities will or may occur in the theory, one
cannot justify beforehand the choice of an abnormality-adaptive logic.
ACL∅2 removes this weakness.
Let me remind the reader that the aim of abnormality-adaptive
logics is not offer the `final' interpretation of the premises. Logical
abnormalities will have to be ruled out; defective theories have to be
replaced. This replacement is not a matter of logic, but it requires the
logical analysis of the defective theory. This is what an adaptive logic
should provide, and this is what ACL∅2 actually does provide for a
very broad set of contexts.
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